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• 9/15/2011 11:58 AM Jaylee Sida wrote:
  Tough question. I think it banks either way, depending how deep one's philosophy allows objects to extend. If you consider objects as wholly independent substances that relate, but don't necessarily band together to form other objects, then change can only be external, a result of other forces. But that seems like a kind of radical atomism that runs contrary to what 'OOO' says, which seems to include some sort of topological depth, allowing small objects to form bigger objects - how else can we account for manmade objects that are constructed out of multiple parts?
  
  That still doesn't answer the question though, does it? Even if you allow the objects can band together to form other objects, you can still maintain that the "banding" is the result of an external force, not a will to act. And positing affect as a will to act only works if you radicalize affect to nonhuman objects. Can one do that, or do some 'OOO' thinkers hold that human consciousness is not metaphysically distinct from other objects, but is nonetheless more sophisticated than other objects precisely because of things like affect, reason, and expressionism?
  
  I'm leaning toward saying yes, it has to be external from all nonhuman objects at least, but that leaves me feeling deeply dissatisfied. What does that mean for social systems? I suppose that change can only result from shifting positionality, or the will to act of the humans comprising the system. As a nonhuman object, it can't change on its own. The only thing internal about a social system changing is the fact that its parts - humans - are prompting the change from within, actualizing latent energy circulating within the system. Wow, my answer gets anthropocentric very fast...I'lll have to think more about this.
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• 9/15/2011 1:00 PM Marisol Bate wrote:
  I actually like where Levi Bryant goes with this, with regard to his discussions of entropy and autopoiesis (coming from his blog and the HTML version of his new book). He argues that every substance must deal with its own internal entropy, or ability to break apart. Defining entropy as a measure of order over time, he argues that highly ordered systems have a low degree of entropy, while highly disordered systems have a high degree of entropy. For entities to exist, they must sustain their order through processes of self-differentiation.
  
  From here, Bryant distinguishes between allopoietic and autopoietic objects-as-systems, where the former are produced by something else (inanimate, manmade, etc.), while the latter are self-reproductive. Two key points come into play: First, the operations of an autopoietic system relate only to themselves, and second, receive information from their environment in a manner that is based on their constitutional organization. This second point is still a little difficult for me because when the term "environment" remains ill-defined, though I think a basic distinction can be made between "environment" as objects and conditions external to a substance and "objectworld" (Kris's term from prior posts) as the inner, constitutional, organizational system internal to an object.
  
  With regard to change, one of Levi's many points, is that to being is difference, is differing. That active process never ceases because of entropy. I'm not sure if the identity of an object can be said to be the local manifestation of self-differentiation or is simply the processes themselves, but the point is that the question is reversed; difference precedes existence ontologically. Change, in the sense of difference, is unceasing. And I'm pretty sure this is what Kris is getting at, though he's being sneaky about it.
  
  Social systems, like a state, are autopoietic objects (see previous posts on this site and over at Larval Subjects) that deliberately maintain their organization - boy do they ever! For change to occur within a social system (like, for example, when disenfranchised populations gain visibility), objects comprising the system (I almost want to say "caught within" the system) assume a different identity or position than the one dictated by the system, increasing the system's degree of entropy. This could cause the system to collapse or be overthrown, but I think we need to acknowledge that system can adjust to accommodate the new "rogue" objects(s), having the effect of bringing the degree of entropy back down to a manageable level, or a level that allows the system to survive. Slavery is a good example here - slaves were freed, but the government withheld rights from black citizens, maintaining some degree of homeostasis.
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  1. 9/15/2011 1:12 PM Kris Coffield wrote:
     She's 19-years-old, folks. NineTEEN. When I was that age, I was playing Riff-Raff in the "The Rocky Horror Show," while paging through Nietzche and thinking he was the most conservative son of a bitch I'd ever read.
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     1. 9/15/2011 8:47 PM Marisol Bate wrote:
        I cross-posted my comment on Levi's blog (without cleaning it up first, unfortunately), along with a question about how an autopoietic system goes about maintaining homeostasis when it's challenged by a rogue object. He probably explains it later in his book, but I'm curious to know how an autopoietic system works, not just what it does. I hope my question doesn't make me seem precocious!
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• 9/15/2011 1:20 PM Hilary Thayer wrote:
  I actually don't have a problem radicalizing affect to nonhuman objects because no object can perfectly translate the experiences or "objectworld" (a nice contrast to "toughtworld," in my opinion) into its own terms. What counts as affect for me wouldn't (most likely) qualify as affect for a dolphin or a meteor. In fact, finitude compels me to say that I may not even recognize the experience of affect of other objects as experience or affect. From that perspective, I don't have a problem with affect being one possible agent of change for any object, be it human, nonhuman, or a social system.
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• 9/15/2011 8:44 PM Craig Whitehead wrote:
  I stake my claim with Hilary; whoever said that affect with purely human? Well, a lot of people throughout history, but I'm all for getting away from that.
  
  I'd be careful about how we operationalize 'change' though, since there are many different kinds of changes - changes in position, changes in constitution, changes in affect, changes in temporality, etc. I'm suspicious of efforts to posit a single type of change as an exemplar of all change, as this seems to go against the object-oriented notion of independence.
  
  Can change by internal? Yes, and especially social, whereby an object used as a part of another object's whole opts out or resists being used, seeks new expression, and thus a new identity. I very much like Latour's notion of 'actants', where objects are actively involved in expressing themselves, and almost have a will of their own.
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